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THE MAGNA CARTA BETRAYED?* 
JED S. RAKOFF** 
The year 2015 marked the eight hundredth anniversary of one of 
the most celebrated, and least read, of the world’s legal texts: the 
Magna Carta. The great twentieth-century British jurist Lord 
Denning described the Magna Carta as “the greatest constitutional 
document of all times—the foundation of the freedom of the 
individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot.” But it was 
not always held in such high repute. Pope Innocent III, in annulling 
the Magna Carta just a couple of months after it was promulgated 
(though it was later reinstated), declared that the charter was “not 
only shameful and demeaning but also illegal and unjust.” And as a 
peace treaty between King John and certain rebel barons—which was 
its purpose—it was something of a flop, with the rebellion continuing 
even after John’s death in 1216. 
The Magna Carta was reputedly drafted by Stephen Langton, the 
archbishop of Canterbury, and while his authorship has been called 
into question regarding the overall document, it seems likely he was 
responsible for the very first operative clause or “chapter.”1 That 
chapter affirms that “the English Church shall be free, and shall have 
its rights undiminished, and its liberties unimpaired.” However, while 
Chapter 1 might be read as a statement of religious freedom, this does 
not appear to have been the chief concern of the barons who 
negotiated the charter: for what follows, in Chapters 2–8, are a series 
of protections for the barons’ widows and heirs against attempts by 
King John to seize the barons’ lands and properties upon their deaths. 
Given what one suspects was the modest life expectancy of the 
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 1. In his marvelous commentary to the 2015 Penguin Classics edition of the Magna 
Carta, David Carpenter writes that while Langton’s input into the Magna Carta was 
mostly indirect, “it was Langton who crafted and inserted what now became the first 
clause,” which “was of overwhelming importance for the Charter’s future.” 
Incidentally, the numbering and separation of the chapters of the Magna Carta were 
added much later by the great eighteenth-century English jurist William Blackstone. The 
original was one long, continuous text. 
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average English baron in those days, it was probably these provisions 
that were uppermost in the barons’ minds. 
But what if the baron died while still indebted to those medieval 
moneylenders, the Jews? Chapters 10 and 11 provide protection for a 
baron’s wife and children against having to pay interest for a time on 
debts owed to Jews (though in Chapter 11 also to others). It is 
remarkable, and disappointing, that so little attention has been paid 
by subsequent commentators to these discriminatory and rather 
cavalierly derogatory chapters.2 In fairness, however, the real purpose 
of these clauses was, as indicated, to prevent a baron’s property from 
falling into the hands of the king after the baron’s death. This was 
because Jews in medieval England were forbidden to own property. 
Indeed, Jews themselves were considered to be a form of property: 
“chattels” belonging to the king. Thus, if a baron or his heirs 
defaulted on a debt by not paying interest, the property securing the 
debt became the property of the king. 
For this reason, John viewed the Jews as useful tools (unlike 
John’s famous predecessor Richard the Lionheart, who went out of 
his way to encourage their murder); and thus these chapters of the 
Magna Carta may even be viewed as providing a certain legal 
validation, not otherwise always provided, of debts owed to Jews. But 
even if read generously in this way, these provisions hardly presaged a 
greater acceptance of Jews by either the barons or the Crown. 
Seventy-five years later, in 1290, King Edward I issued an order 
expelling all Jews from England. 
The next twenty-five chapters or so are chiefly concerned with 
taxes, fines, and other assessments by the Crown, and are not without 
relevance to future laws forbidding excessive fines and the like, or 
even, in Chapter 12’s prohibition of “scutage” (a tax levied in lieu of 
military service) without consent, the doctrine of no taxation without 
representation. But it is only when we get to Chapter 39 that we find 
the language for which the Magna Carta is chiefly known. Chapter 39 
reads: 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his 
standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with force 
 
 2. Thus, for example, Dan Jones, in his recent and otherwise very well crafted 
history of the Magna Carta, largely relegates to a footnote his discussion of the role of the 
Magna Carta in reinforcing the harsh treatment of the Jews of medieval England. See Dan 
Jones, Magna Carta: The Birth of Liberty (Viking, 2015), pp. 46–47. 
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against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful 
judgement of his equals or by the law of the land. 
Much of what we would today refer to as the right to due process and, 
more broadly, the rule of law are neatly summed up in this one 
sentence. 
ut how were these rights to be enforced? After a bunch of 
other chapters—dealing with such “pressing” matters as removing 
from public office the kinsmen of Gerard de Athée (Chapter 50), who 
was one of King John’s favorite hit men, and releasing from hostage 
the sisters of King Alexander II of Scotland (Chapter 59), whom John 
wanted to prevent from marrying French nobles with whom the 
rebellious Scots sought to ally—the Magna Carta creates an executive 
committee of twenty-five elected barons to administer its provisions. 
In practice, however, this proved unwieldy and ultimately 
unworkable. 
To actually realize the promise of Chapter 39, two things were, at 
a minimum, necessary: first, an acknowledgment by the holder of 
executive power that he was subordinate to the law of the land, and 
must not only abide by it but also enforce it; and second, a mechanism 
by which those who were wrongly detained by the executive in 
violation of the law of the land might be brought before a court and 
freed. In the United States, part of the first requirement was met, 
broadly speaking, by the enactment of the Constitution and by Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s declaration in Marbury v. Madison that 
ultimate authority for the interpretation of the Constitution lay with 
the Supreme Court. But this is not to say that our chief executives 
always accepted the rule of law. Indeed, many of our strongest 
executives would, on occasion, defy it. Thus when the Supreme Court 
held in 1832 that Indian tribes must be treated as sovereign nations, 
President Andrew Jackson allegedly responded by saying: “John 
Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.” And when 
the Civil War broke out, President Abraham Lincoln 
unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus, leading his 
secretary of state, William Seward, to boast to a British minister: “I 
can touch a bell . . . and order the imprisonment of [US citizens], and 
no power on earth, except that of the President of the United States, 
can release [them].” 
Which brings us to the second requirement of the rule of law, 
namely, a mechanism by which a court can free those who are 
wrongly imprisoned by the executive in violation of the law. The chief 
B
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such mechanism, of course, is the writ of habeas corpus, by which a 
court can require that a detained or imprisoned person be brought 
before a court, so that the law of the land can be applied to her case. 
Contrary to what some writers and even judges have sometimes 
implied, the writ itself is not to be found in the Magna Carta. Indeed, 
it was not meaningfully developed until several centuries later. But 
the development of the writ was a necessary requirement if the rights 
put forth in Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta were to be realized. As 
Justice John Paul Stevens, quoting Justice Robert H. Jackson, wrote 
for the Supreme Court in the 2004 case of Rasul v. Bush: 
Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and 
lawless since John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man 
should be imprisoned, dispossessed, outlawed, or exiled save by 
the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The judges 
of England developed the writ of habeas corpus largely to 
preserve these immunities from executive restraint. 
But does the Great Writ still serve this vital function, or has it 
been compromised to the point of ineffectuality? I suggest that there 
is at least some cause for concern, and in that regard, I would mention 
two rather different examples: the detention camp at Guantánamo 
and the statute known as the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). 
n some respects, the legal history of the Guantánamo detention 
camp illustrates the continuing power, not just of the writ of habeas 
corpus, but also of the Magna Carta. In the four years between 2004 
and 2008, the Supreme Court considered four cases involving 
Guantánamo, culminating in the great decision Boumediene v. Bush. 
The plaintiff, Lakhdar Boumediene, had filed a habeas petition in 
federal district court, alleging that he was not in fact an enemy 
combatant and was being detained at Guantánamo without being 
given any opportunity to prove his innocence in a court of law. But in 
reaction to earlier petitions from Guantánamo detainees, Congress 
had passed a statute providing that “no court, justice, or judge shall 
have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of 
habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained . . . as an 
enemy combatant.” 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held the statute 
unconstitutional. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
expressly relied on the role of the writ in enforcing the fundamental 
principle of Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta that no one may be 
I
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imprisoned except by the law of the land. While Congress, unlike the 
president, had the power to suspend the writ, Congress could do so 
only in “cases of rebellion or invasion,” neither of which were present 
in the contemporary American situation. And, the Court continued, 
the writ extended not just to American citizens, but also to aliens 
being held on US territory, which Guantánamo was for all practical 
purposes. 
As a theoretical matter, it is hard to overestimate the importance 
of Boumediene, for it asserted the power of the Court to guarantee 
the right to the writ of habeas corpus, and hence the right to the 
protection of the laws, even in situations arising from the so-called 
War on Terror. One has only to contrast Boumediene with the failure 
of the Supreme Court to hold Lincoln’s suspension of the writ 
unconstitutional until the Civil War was over, its failure to address the 
questionable legal validity of the Vietnam War, and, most shamefully, 
its validation of the detention of Japanese-Americans during World 
War II, to see how groundbreaking was the Court’s decision in 
Boumediene. And the force of the Court’s reasoning lay, first and 
foremost, in its reliance on the principles set forth in Chapter 39 of 
the Magna Carta and its recognition of the essential role of habeas 
corpus in making those principles a reality. As Justice Kennedy wrote 
for the Court: 
Magna Carta decreed that no man would be imprisoned 
contrary to the law of the land. . . . Important as the principle 
was, the Barons at Runnymede prescribed no specific legal 
process to enforce it. . . . [But] gradually the writ of habeas 
corpus became the means by which the promise of Magna Carta 
was fulfilled. 
It was to fulfill that promise that the Court, in Boumediene, rejected 
Congress’s attempt to deny habeas relief to the prisoners in 
Guantánamo. 
As a practical matter, however, the effect of Boumediene has 
been much more limited. Seven years later—despite the president’s 
pledge to shut down Guantánamo and free its detainees—nearly one 
hundred persons remain in detention there, most of whom have never 
had access to an Article III court and half of whom have never been 
charged with any crime in the decade or more that they have been 
there. And in every case in which any of these so-called “forever 
prisoners”—neither charged with a crime nor cleared for release—has 
filed a habeas petition, the government has opposed the petition, 
arguing that the resolution of such petitions should await the outcome 
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of the pledge to close Guantánamo. Such opposition from the 
government, combined with repeated congressional opposition to the 
detainees’ release and rather obvious foot-dragging by the 
Department of Defense, has rendered the promise of Boumediene 
materially unfulfilled. 
his brings me to my second example. The ability of Congress 
and the executive to effectively hamstring habeas relief is nowhere 
better illustrated than in the case of AEDPA. This statute was 
enacted, with strong bipartisan support, in 1996, and although the title 
of the act begins with the word “Antiterrorism,” the rest of the title, 
“Effective Death Penalty Act,” gives away the statute’s primary 
immediate purpose: to reduce the ability of state prisoners facing the 
death penalty to obtain federal habeas relief. Specifically, even before 
the Innocence Project revealed that dozens of state prisoners 
sentenced to death were factually innocent of the crimes of which 
they were accused, the federal courts were sufficiently skeptical about 
the processes used by many states that they granted federal habeas 
relief in a substantial number of such cases. The unstated purpose of 
AEDPA was to narrow federal habeas relief so that more such 
people could be promptly executed. 
More broadly, the purpose of AEDPA was to reduce access to 
the federal courts by those convicted of any kind of crime in state 
courts, by limiting the scope of habeas review. To put this in 
perspective, the mid-1990s were the heyday of the so-called “war on 
crime” that led to mandatory minimum sentences and other onerous 
statutes designed to reduce rising crime rates and that resulted in the 
devastating mass incarceration of which many Americans are now 
beginning to become aware. Also, as more and more persons were 
incarcerated, many for prolonged terms, more and more habeas 
petitions were filed, leading to calls from even the judiciary to find 
ways to stem this “flood.” 
Ironically, the statistics I have seen suggest that AEDPA has not 
led to a decrease in habeas petitions, but only to a decrease in the 
percentage of successful petitions. Even before the enactment of 
AEDPA, certain decisions of the Rehnquist Court had narrowed the 
reach of those Warren Court cases that had extended fundamental 
due process to the states, so that successful habeas petitions had 
declined prior to AEDPA’s enactment to only 1 percent of those 
filed. But after AEDPA was passed, successful habeas petitions 
declined to a minuscule one third of 1 percent. Why this precipitous 
decline? 
T
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First and foremost, it is because of AEDPA’s requirement that a 
habeas petition not be granted unless the state court decision that is 
being challenged is either contrary to, or an unreasonable application 
of, Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
interpreted this requirement so as to limit successful habeas petitions 
to those in which the alleged violations are so blatant as to be totally 
indefensible. The practical effect is to halt the prior federal practice of 
employing habeas review to bring new conditions of fairness to the 
steamroller systems of criminal justice found in too many states. 
In addition to severely limiting the scope of habeas review, 
AEDPA greatly narrows habeas in other ways. For example, it 
requires total exhaustion of state review before the petition can be 
filed, and then requires that the petition be filed within one year of 
that exhaustion. As a result, 22 percent of all habeas filings are 
dismissed as untimely. AEDPA also places stringent restrictions on 
the petitioner’s ability to file a second or subsequent habeas petition; 
it limits the circumstances under which a federal district court can 
convene an evidentiary hearing to assess any factual issues raised by 
the petition; and it places numerous other hypertechnical hurdles in 
the way of habeas review of the merits. 
Often the only way to avoid these technical hurdles is to allege 
ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, if the failure to exhaust 
state remedies, or to raise a crucial issue while pursuing state 
remedies, was a function of counsel’s failure to do so, then a habeas 
petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel might prevail. The 
result is that an increasing number of instances of habeas review that 
get beyond procedural defects focus on whether defense counsel 
acted properly rather than on whether the state’s own practices and 
procedures are fair. Although such cases are often categorized by 
government statisticians as “reaching the merits,” in fact such cases 
do little to change substantive law. 
This does not appear particularly to bother the Supreme Court, 
which has, on the whole, been supportive of AEDPA against the few 
attacks that have made it to the top court. Perhaps this is because 
AEDPA serves as a protector of states’ rights, a cause close to the 
heart of the Court’s conservative majority, which views the right of 
individual states to exercise plenary oversight of their criminal justice 
systems as fundamental to federalism. It is worth noting in this 
connection that Boumediene was solely concerned with federal 
power. 
The result is that in most criminal cases today, the real “law of 
the land,” so far as fundamental fairness is concerned, is the law of 
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each individual state, bereft of any effective federal oversight. More 
fundamentally, what this means is that Congress, with the Supreme 
Court’s acquiescence, has arrogated to itself the power to greatly limit 
the scope of habeas relief. This, I respectfully suggest, is totally 
inconsistent with the fundamental principles enunciated in Chapter 39 
of the Magna Carta. 
 
